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Abstract
This article investigates the paradox of insider information and performance pay as
it pertains to managerial compensation. The paradox is that managers are permitted
to exploit their role as insiders for personal ￿nancial gain when simple directives issued
by their board of directors could eliminate this practice. Our empirical evidence shows
that managers signi￿cantly bene￿t from their ￿rm￿ s good fortune through their choice
of compensation package and trading ￿rm securities. We prove in our theoretical
framework that the manager should not pro￿t from changes in the value of the ￿rm
if he signs an optimal contract, if there is only private information but not moral
hazard. Therein lies an explanation for the paradox. Shareholders permit managers
to personally exploit hidden information about the ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability because it helps
incentivize their work activities as well. Our structural estimates of a pure moral hazard
model show that the bene￿ts to the ￿rm from letting managerial compensation depend
on abnormal returns to solve the moral hazard problem far outweigh the savings in
reduced compensation that would be realized if managers were paid ￿xed wages.
1 Introduction
Firm executives are much better informed than shareholders about the prospects of the
enterprise, and its demands on managerial time, energy and expertise. As opportunities to
make the ￿rm more pro￿table are explored, management gain foresight into which ventures
are likely to be successful, and those which will probably fail, putting them in a favorable
position to trade on their insider knowledge. If a manager could choose how many ￿rm
speci￿c assets to hold without incurring penalties directed at those who engage in insider
trading, he might prefer holding more stock and options in his own ￿rm when his private
prognosis was more favorable than the market￿ s, and less ￿rm speci￿c assets when his insider
knowledge projects a worse outcome than what stockholders and other investors think.
￿We thank seminar participants at New York University, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University,
University of Essex, London School of Economics, Duke University and Cornell University for their comments.
1As de￿ned by the Securities and Exchange Commission, insider trading is illegal, but
their description of this activity suggests that the Commission is primarily concerned with
combatting insider pro￿ts from arbitrage.1 How the commission enforces rules against insider
trading supports this view. Harris (2003) describes how the SEC prepares to prosecute cases
of alleged insider trading. Large volume transactions accompanied by big price shifts are
a signal that information about the ￿rm￿ s prospects may have been exploited by insiders.
When alerted to a possible infringement (perhaps by a trader who believes he was exploited
by an insider), the SEC compiles a list of investors who traded during the period under
consideration, the insiders privy to information that led to the price change, and tries to
match parties from both lists.
One simple way of resolving the insider trading problem is for the board of directors to
prevent the manager from ever holding any of the ￿rm￿ s assets. Existing regulations in the
United States require the manager to frequently report all trading in the ￿rm￿ s assets, so this
would be a relatively straightforward requirement to enforce. In the absence of moral hazard
and/or the opportunity to bene￿t from inside trading, is hard to imagine why a manager
would prefer to hold ￿nancial assets in his own ￿rm compared to the alternative of holding
a well diversi￿ed portfolio. Managers of nonpro￿t enterprises and high ranking government
o¢ cials are routinely required to divest themselves of assets that may cause a con￿ ict of in-
terest between their professional role and personal wealth management. Therefore managers
should have no more qualms about agreeing to such a requirement, than agreeing to rules
governing company perks, or theft of company property. Thus the board could greatly curb
if not entirely eliminate insider trading by issuing a simple easily enforced directive to their
executive management.
In reality a large portion of executive compensation is tied to ￿rm speci￿c assets. From
1In a pamphlet available on line, the SEC provides information about bounties to those who help expose
insider trading:
"Section 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. 78u-
l(e)] authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission ("") to award a bounty to a person
who provides information leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from an insider trader, from
a person who "tipped" information to an insider trader, or from a person who directly or indi-
rectly controlled an insider trader. . . . "Insider trading" refers generally to buying or selling
a security, in breach of a ￿duciary duty or other relationship of trust and con￿dence, while in
possession of material, non-public information about the security. Insider trading violations
may also include "tipping" such information, securities trading by the person "tipped" and
securities trading by those who misappropriate such information. Examples of insider trading
cases that have been brought by the Commission are cases against: corporate o¢ cers, directors,
and employees who traded the corporation￿ s securities after learning of signi￿cant, con￿dential
corporate developments; friends, business associates, family members, and other "tippees" of
such o¢ cers, directors, and employees, who traded the securities after receiving such informa-
tion; employees of law, banking, brokerage and printing ￿rms who were given such information
in order to provide services to the corporation whose securities they traded; government em-
ployees who learned of such information because of their employment by the government; and
other persons who misappropriated, and took advantage of, con￿dential information from their
employers . . . Because insider trading undermines investor con￿dence in the fairness and
integrity of the securities markets, the Commission has treated the detection and prosecution
of insider trading violations as one of its enforcement priorities."
2an empirical standpoint, trading by corporate insiders appears to be pro￿table. Seyhun
(1986) ￿nds that insiders tend to buy before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell before
an abnormal decline. Earlier studies by Lorie and Niederho⁄er (1968), Ja⁄e (1974), and
Finnerty (1976) draw similar conclusions. More recently, Seyhun (1992a) ￿nds compelling
evidence that insider trading volume, frequency, and pro￿tability all increases signi￿cantly
during the 1980s. Over the decade, he documents that insiders earned over 5 percent ab-
normal returns on average. Seyhun (1992b) determines that insider trades predict up to 60
of the total variation in one-year-ahead returns. To summarize, hidden information is an
economically important phenomenon in executive compensation.
So it is paradoxical that managers are compensated on the basis of their ￿rm￿ s perfor-
mance, such as dividends and capital gains, when the pro￿tability of the ￿rm partly depends
on how managers assess their own accomplishments and ￿rm￿ s prospects. Bebchuk and Fried
(2003) and others have argued that one reason why managers are paid stock options instead
of assets that are easier to value, such as cash, is that shareholders underestimate the true
cost of granting options that are much harder to value. Similarly Bertrand and Mullainthan
(2000, 2001) argue that separation and control allows the CEO to gain e⁄ective control of
the pay-setting process. They argue that skimming is less likely to attract the attention
of shareholders when the ￿rm performs well. Consequently granting options should be an
excellent vehicle for skimming, costing shareholders nothing when the ￿rm performs poorly.
This paper analyzes the quantitative importance of insider information and performance
pay. In Section 2 we brie￿ y describing the data set and then regress the manager￿ s portfolio
choices on next period￿ s abnormal returns to the ￿rm, ￿nding the latter are positive and
signi￿cant, evidence that future returns are a noisy indicator of inside information available
to the manager. To quantify the magnitudes of the insider advantage, we construct a simple
dynamic portfolio strategy based on changes in asset holdings by managers, and ￿nd that
this strategy signi￿cantly outperforms the market.
In the latter parts of Section 2 we investigate whether managerial compensation varies
with idiosyncratic components to the return of his ￿rm. After controlling for the manager￿ s
portfolio choices and other factors that a⁄ect abnormal returns, we ￿nd that the unexplained
variation in abnormal returns are both positive and signi￿cant. We interpret this result as
evidence that managers are motivated, through their work choices, to raise the mean of
unanticipated abnormal returns, if they can. These new ￿ndings suggest a second explana-
tion for why shareholders do not prevent managers from personally exploiting their insider
knowledge about the ￿rm. If their actions are also hidden and a⁄ect ￿rm performance, then
not linking the manager￿ s wealth to the ￿rm￿ s value might create a moral hazard problem.
Section 3 takes up the idea that both insider information and moral hazard might play a
role in contracting with managers. In this model shareholders do not observe the manager￿ s
activities and can only prevent him from engaging in insider trade that involves arbitrage.
Contracts between shareholders and executives must satisfy three conditions, a participation
constraint, that assures the manager she will have higher expected utility from employment
with her ￿rm rather than another one, an incentive compatibility constraint, that induces
her to maximize the value of the ￿rm rather than using the resources of the ￿rm to pursue
some other objective, and truth telling constraint that induces the manager to reveal her
inside information. We show that without moral hazard the optimal contract is to pay
the manager a ￿xed compensation irrespective of how much private information he has.
3Second, insider information is not intrinsically linked to the moral hazard problem in sense
we make explicit, then although the optimal contract should depend on the ￿rm￿ s abnormal
returns, permitting the manager to exploit her insider information is suboptimal. Third, if
moral hazard and private information are intrinsically linked, then the gains from private
information can be incorporated into the optimal contract. Rather than preclude insider
trading, the board might optimally sanction it.
Although linking pay to performance can be rationalized within theoretical models of
optimal contracting with moral hazard and hidden actions, the practical relevance of moral
hazard to managerial compensation is ultimately an empirical phenomenon. In Section 4
we assess its importance by estimating the parameters of a pure moral hazard model, in
this way adding to the evidence found by Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller
(2008a) on smaller data sets. These estimates corroborate the earlier work, showing that the
losses ￿rms would incur from paying executives a constant wage are much greater than the
relatively small amount shareholders pay to incentivize them.
2 Insider Wealth, Abnormal Returns and Compensa-
tion
This section contains a brief description of the longitudinal data set compiled for undertaking
the empirical work. Then we conduct a linear regression analysis of empirical evidence on
insider trading. We ￿rst focus on changes in stockholding that occur before the period begins
to investigate whether they help predict future returns. Using a model with a simple linear
decision rule for insider trading, we test whether managers condition on more information
than the market does in forming their expectations about future returns. This leads into
some simulations that seek to quantify the magnitudes of the gains to managers from their
insider trading opportunities. Finally we check whether, conditional on the information held
by the manager, compensation to managers ￿ uctuates with ￿rm returns. If so, this would
provide evidence of asymmetric information that goes beyond insider trading opportunities.
2.1 Data
Our analysis is based on longitudinal data gathered from three main sources: Standard &
Poor￿ s ExecuComp, Compustat databases, and Executive Compensation Reports data on
￿rm compensation plan responses to Section 162(m). Our database tracks about 1,500 ￿rms
over an 9 year panel beginning 1992 in the S&P 500, Midcap, and Smallcap indices, and
contains information on the six highest paid executives for 1,837 unique CUSIP identi￿ers.
For much of our work we partitioned ￿rms by the ten sectors described in Table 1, labeling
them as Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health
Care, Financial, Information Technology, Telecommunications Services,and Utilities.
Our data is similar but not identical to two of the three samples used by Gayle and
Miller (2008a) to investigate how managerial compensation has changed over the last sixty
years. To economize on the description given in this analysis, and to facilitate comparisons
between the results of both papers, it is worth spelling out those di⁄erences here. The ￿rst
sample in our companion paper, originally constructed by Masson (1971) and later extended
4by Antle and Smith (1985,1986), only tracks selected ￿rms in the aerospace, chemicals and
electronics industries up until 1977, and is not relevant for our immediate purposes. Their
second sample includes our data set, because it is compiled in exactly the same way for a
longer time period, namely 1992 through 2003 versus 2001. The third sample is a subset of
the second, selecting only those ￿rms in the three industries mentioned above. Given the
subject matter, the companion paper is mainly concerned with the ￿rst and third samples;
the second sample is only used to show how representative the industries originally selected
by Masson (1971) are in more recent years. Thus the sample used in this paper is a large
subset of the second sample in our companion paper, has many more observations than the
third sample, containing most but not all of its observations. For these reasons it would
be redundant to provide a detailed summary of the data here, Tables 1 though 4 of our
companion paper providing a relatively comprehensive of the third sample.
Table 2 shows the average ￿rm size using three measures, sales, equity and assets. The
standard deviations are about twice to three times as large as the sample means, which are
a little lower but still comparable to those in the third sample described in Gayle and Miller
(2008b). We report two measures of income, the return on assets and abnormal returns. The
latter are de￿ned for the nth ￿rm at time t as
xnt = ￿nt ￿ ￿t
where ￿t denotes the return on the market portfolio in period t and ￿nt is the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial
return. Thus xnt is a relative measure that uses stock market performance as a benchmark.
We also experimented with other benchmark performance measures such as industry and
sector returns, but they do not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the results reported below. Note that
measures of income are much more dispersed than the measures of ￿rm size with standard
deviations about twenty times the respective sample means.
Total compensation and pretax salary and bonus, one of its components, are summarized
in Table 3. The other main components in executive compensation are stock and option
grants, vested retirement bene￿ts, as well as gains and losses from abnormal returns on
stocks and other ￿nancial securities in the manager￿ s portfolio. The reason for including
the last component is that outsiders eliminate ￿rm speci￿c risk by holding only a negligible
amount of any given ￿rm￿ s securities from their wealth portfolios, in this way guaranteeing
the return on the market portfolio, rather a random variable distributed about that return.
Thus the fact each manager is so heavily vested in her own ￿rm indicates a professional
interest that comes with her job. We report averages for the CEO, as well as the next ￿ve
highest paid executives in the ￿rm, along with the respective standard deviations.
The main patterns in this data set are re￿ ected in many other samples of executive
compensation. The CEO receives less than half of her compensation in salary and bonus,
which exhibits much lower variability than the sum of the other components, both between
and within industries or sectors. Lower ranked o¢ cers are paid less than CEOs and receive
a higher proportion of their pay in salary and bonus.
2.2 Executive portfolio choices and future returns
If managers were more informed than the market and were able to exploit this information
for personal gain, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the information impounded in future
5returns would help predict what choices managers had already taken with respect to their
wealth portfolios. In that case abnormal returns would be a noisy predictor of retrospective
choices. We now denote the conditional expectation of the abnormal return in period t + 1
based on all the information available to the manager in period t as:
un;t+￿ ￿ Et+￿ [xn;t+1]
and let qn;t+￿ denote stock purchases by the manager in period t: Temporarily assuming that
the manager￿ s decision rule for trading is linear in this expectation, we obtain the relation:
qn;t+￿ = ￿0 + ￿1un;t+￿
￿ ￿0 + ￿1xn;t+1 + ￿1"n;t+1
where, by the de￿nition of un;t+￿ :
Et+1 ["n;t+1 jun;t+￿] = 0
If we impose the additional restriction that ￿0 = 0; then this decision rule may be
interpreted as a linear approximation to the optimal rule for a risk averse expected utility
maximizer confronted with a favorable gamble. When ￿0 = 0 the rule implies that qn;t+￿ ￿ 0
if and only if un;t+￿ ￿ 0: From the de￿nition of un;t+￿, this is true if and only if Et+￿ [xn;t+1]
and the unconditional expectation, E [xn;t+1] = 0, are the same. In that case insider trading
is conducted if and only if the manager has insider information about next period￿ s abnormal











The expression is positive if and only if ￿1 > 0:
The results from running this regression are reported in Table 4. The coe¢ cient on lead
abnormal return, ￿1; is positive and signi￿cant in the sample as predicted by this simple
model of insider information. Also consistent with the simple linear model ￿0; the constant
term, is insigni￿cant. In the same regression we also included the ratio of (contemporaneous)
salary and bonus to total compensation to investigate whether the manager takes a lower
salary and bonus in return for more claims that are contingent on the ￿rms￿return. Although
the sign of ￿2 is negative, it is not statistically signi￿cant. The lack of signi￿cance should
not, however be interpreted as evidence against the model, since the manager is free to draw
from her own outside wealth to invest in her ￿rms￿stock when promising prospects arise.
Managers are required to report all their trading activity to the SEC within a month,
and their reports are available for public scrutiny. Consequently our ￿nding that managers
appear to exploit inside information when investing in their own ￿rm raises the possibility
that others might be able to bene￿t from their serendipitous choices. Table 5 presents our
￿ndings from regressing abnormal returns on the manager￿ s lagged trading activity, providing
some evidence of how well their trading activity is a useful predictor of abnormal returns. The
estimated coe¢ cients in question are positive and signi￿cant in both regressions, consistent
with the hypothesis that managers exploit insider information. The estimates also show
6there is a negative relationship between abnormal returns of the ￿rm and the ratio of salary
and bonus to total compensation, but again the relationship is statistically insigni￿cant,
reinforcing our earlier suggestion that resources used for insider trading need not come at
the expense of other components in the compensation package, but could simply re￿ ect an
adjustment in the manager￿ s asset portfolio.
Much of the evidence from Tables 4 and 5 supports the notion that managers exploit
their superior knowledge about their own ￿rm￿ s performance on the stock market, but not
all. As above, suppose the manager follows the linear decision rule for insider trading, and
has access to the other regressors listed in Table 5, which we now call znt. In this case the
inverse of the coe¢ cient on lagged changes in the manager￿ s stock holdings is ￿1, and the
coe¢ cients values on all the other variables are zero because
xn;t+1 = ￿
￿1
1 qn;t+￿ ￿ ￿0￿
￿1
1 ￿ "n;t+1
and the manager￿ s forecast error satis￿es the conditional expectation
E ["n;t+1 jznt] = 0
Hence, our ￿nding that several coe¢ cients are signi￿cant, constitutes evidence against the





can obtained by subtracting 1 from
the product of the estimated coe¢ cient on xn;t+1 in Table 4 and the estimated coe¢ cient on
qn;t+￿ in Table 5. The estimated variance is negative, casting further doubt on the linear
speci￿cation.
2.3 Gains from insider trading
To gauge the magnitude of the gains from insider trading, we conducted a simulation exercise
to retrospectively evaluate how lucrative it would have been to base a portfolio investment
strategy on data from these reports over the 9 year period covered by the new data set. The
simulations generated the outcomes of three self ￿nancing strategies. The ￿rst strategy is an
outsider strategy, to invest in the market portfolio. The third strategy is only feasible if the
inside investor perfectly anticipates the one period ahead abnormal return of the companies;
an investor privy to perfect inside information pertaining to the nth ￿rm invests all her wealth
in its shares in period t if ￿n;t+1 > ￿t+1 and all of it in the market portfolio if ￿n;t+1 ￿ ￿t+1;




Note there is an upper bound to the gains from perfect foresight because it is self ￿nancing
strategy after the initial outlay.
The second strategy allocates a fraction of the manager￿ s discretionary wealth, ￿nt; to
the market portfolio in period t, and the remaining proportion (1 ￿ ￿nt) to stock in the nth
￿rm for a return of
￿
(2)
n;t+1 = ￿nt￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿nt)￿n;t+1
where ￿nt re￿ ect the historical portfolio choices of the nth manager as observed in the data.
Here discretionary wealth is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the maximum observed wealth
7observed the executive in the ￿rm




W n = min
t2f1;:::;Tg
fWntg
Thus ￿nt is de￿ned by
￿nt ￿
Wnt ￿ W n
W n ￿ W n
We compared the outcomes of these three investment strategies, to see whether following
the reports managers submit would have been pro￿table, and how much of the potential
gains from clairvoyance managers are able to extract. Table 6 shows the market return
averaged almost 8:9 percent growth per year in this period, but if an executive could have
perfectly anticipated returns in her own ￿rm, she would have reaped gains of 19:6 percent
per year on average. More surprising is our result that almost all these gains are realized by
following the second strategy we de￿ned, which produced an annual gain of 19:2 percent.
As a last check we investigated whether the cumulative gain from following these di⁄erent























for various (i;j) 2 f1;2;3g where ￿
(1)
nt ￿ ￿t is the market return and n 2 f1;:::;Ng is the
sample population of executives. The results are presented in Table 7. They show that while
perfect foresight beats everything, building an investment strategy based on the manager￿ s
stock holding is also signi￿cantly more pro￿table than specializing in the market portfolio.
2.4 Evidence for moral hazard
The evidence presented above favors the view that managers undertake insider trading,
exploiting privy information to trade in their ￿rm￿ s stock at the expense of shareholders.
We argued in the introduction that these activities are tacitly or explicitly approved by their
respective boards of directors because insider trading by managers could be greatly curbed
or even eliminated. Boards could require managers to refrain from owning ￿nancial assets
of the ￿rms they manage. After all certain positions in the public sector, such as elected
o¢ ces, require the occupant to divest herself of assets in ￿rms that might create a con￿ ict
of interest between his professional duties and the incentives of the ￿rms￿shareholders. One
reason why boards might be reluctant to discourage insider trading is that compensation
from insider trading might help align incentives between shareholders and the manager. If
so, executive compensation packages might also depend on those components of abnormal
returns that are not anticipated by inside knowledge.
Recall xn;t+1 is the abnormal return in the upcoming period t+1 and "n;t+1 is the residual
of abnormal returns that the manager of ￿rm n does not anticipate. Let wn;t+1 denote her
compensation paid at the beginning of the next period t+1. If insider trading does not fully
8resolve the con￿ icts of interest between shareholder and management objectives, then the
board of directors should make wn;t+1 depend positively on "n;t+1:
Since "n;t+1 is unobserved, we regressed wn;t+1 on a estimate of "n;t+1; simultaneously
controlling for other variables that managers use in forming their expectations about xn;t+1:
Based on the identity "n;t+1 ￿ xn;t+1￿un;t+￿; where un;t+￿ ￿ Et+￿ [xn;t+1] is her conditional
expectation in period t about xn;t+1; we formed:
b "n;t+1 ￿ xn;t+1 ￿ b un;t+￿
from the estimated expectation function presented in Table 5. Then we regressed wn;t+1 on
b "n;t+1 as well as the variables used in estimating b un;t+￿: Our estimates in Table 8 show that
managers are rewarded (punished) when the unanticipated component of abnormal returns
is higher (lower) than they expected, suggesting that shareholders are not only less informed
about the economic prospects of their ￿rm, but also that shareholders do not fully monitor
the activities of their management. We take up this idea in the next section.
3 Generalized Moral Hazard
To illustrate the interactions between insider information, moral hazard and executive com-
pensation we borrow an example analyzed by Gayle and Miller (2008b) in more detail. After
paying the manager for her work in the previous period, at the beginning of each period the
board of directors proposes a compensation plan to the manager, which depends on the real-
ization of the ￿rms abnormal returns as well as accounting information to be later provided
by the manager. Based on the board￿ s proposal the manager decides whether to remain with
the ￿rm or leave and picks real consumption expenditure for the period. Having accepted
the contract o⁄er, the manager observes the ￿rms prospects, provides some accounting in-
formation, and chooses a work routine that is not observed by the directors. The return
on the ￿rms assets are realized at the end of the period. It depends on how well the ￿rm
was managed during the period, the private information available to the manager, as well as
other unanticipated factors. The objective of the manager is to sequentially maximize her
expected lifetime utility, and the goal of the ￿rm is expected value maximization.
3.1 The model
More speci￿cally, at the beginning of period t the manager is paid compensation denoted
wt for her work in period t ￿ 1 according to the schedule the shareholders had previously
committed, and her managerial contracts is up for renewal. She makes her consumption
choice, a positive real number denoted by ct, and the board proposes a new contract. At
that time the manager chooses whether to be engaged by the ￿rm or be engaged outside
the ￿rm, either with another ￿rm or in retirement. Denote this decision by the indicator
lt0 2 f0;1g, where lt0 = 1 if the manager chooses to be engaged outside the ￿rm and lt0 = 0
if she chooses to be engaged inside the ￿rm. If lt0 = 0, the prospects of the ￿rm are then
fully revealed to the manager but partially hidden to the shareholders.
We assume throughout that managers privately observe st 2 f1;2g in period t; infor-
mation that a⁄ects the distribution of the ￿rm￿ s abnormal returns. The board announces
9how managerial compensation will be determined as a function of s0
t 2 f1;2g; what she tells
them about the ￿rm￿ s prospects and its subsequent performance, as measured by abnormal
returns xt+1 revealed at the beginning period t + 1. The manager truthfully declares or lies
about the ￿rm￿ s prospects by announcing s0
t 2 S; e⁄ectively selecting a schedule w(s0
t;xt+1)
indexed by her announcement s0
t:
She then makes her unobserved labor e⁄ort choice, denoted by ltj 2 f0;1g for j 2 f1;2g
in each period t. There are two possibilities, to work diligently for the ￿rm by pursuing
the shareholders objectives of value maximization, and indicated by setting lt2 = 1; or to
be employed by the ￿rm but shirk, following di⁄erent objectives than maximizing the ￿rm￿ s
value, and here denoted by lt1 = 1. Let lt ￿ (lt0;lt1;lt2) 2 f(1;0;0);(0;1;0);(0;0;1)g:
At the beginning of the period t + 1 abnormal returns xt+1 for the ￿rm are drawn from
a probability distribution which depends on the true state st and the manager￿ s action
lt. We denote the probability density function for abnormal returns in period t when the
manager works diligently and the state is s by fs (xt+1); and let fs (xt+1)gs (xt+1) denote
the probability density function for abnormal returns in period t when the manager shirks,
bounded below by the same real number  . Note that gs (x) is the likelihood ratio for
abnormal returns from shirking versus working diligently in state s. We assume the ￿rm￿ s
losses from shirking does not depend on the state, meaning f1 (x)g1 (x) ￿ f2 (x)g2 (x). This
assumption ensures that opportunities a⁄orded by the better state can only be realized if
the manager is diligent.
Preferences over consumption and work are parameterized by a utility function exhibiting
absolute risk aversion that is additively separable over periods and multiplicatively separable








where ￿ is the constant subjective discount factor, ￿ is the constant absolute level of risk
aversion, and ￿j is a utility parameters with consumption equivalent ￿￿￿1 log(￿j) that
measures the distaste from working at level j 2 f0;1;2g. We assume ￿2 > ￿1 meaning
that compared to the activity called shirking, diligence is more aligned to the shareholders￿
interest than the manager￿ s interests, and without loss of generality scale utility so that
￿0 = 1. This simply means that ￿j values the nonpecuniary features of engaging in activity
j 2 f1;2g within the ￿rm relative to the total utility value from leaving the ￿rm.
The manager￿ s wealth is endogenously determined by her consumption and compen-
sation. We assume there are a complete set of markets for all publicly disclosed events,
e⁄ectively attributing all deviations from the law of one price to the market imperfections
under consideration.
3.2 Feasible contracts
Drawing upon the work of Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), we can show that the
optimal long term contract solved by shareholders can be implemented by a sequence of short
term contracts. The cornerstone of the constraint formulation for the one period contract
is the indirect utility function for a manager choosing between immediate retirement versus
retirement one period hence. From Proposition 2 in Margiotta and Miller (2000) a manager
10who is contemplating immediate retirement in period t; versus retirement next period in
t + 1; and who is o⁄ered a contract of w(s0


















[gs (x)lt1 + lt2]
￿
fs (x)dx (1)
where bt denote the period t price of an in￿nitely lived bond paying a unit of consumption
from period t onwards.
Appealing to Myerson (1982), the revelation principle implies that, without loss of gen-
erality, we can restrict the set of feasible contracts to those that respect the participation,
incentive compatibility and truth telling constraints we now de￿ne. The participation con-
straint states that the manager prefers working one more period and then leaving to not
working for the ￿rm at all. Suppressing the bond price for expositional convenience, let
vs (x) measure how utility is scaled up by compensation if abnormal returns x are realized
at the end of the current period t when state s is announced:
vs (x) ￿ exp[￿￿ws (x)=bt+1]
To induce an honest, diligent manager to participate, her expected utility from employment
must exceed the utility she would obtain from retirement. Setting (lt2;s0
t) = (1;st) in (1)










The incentive compatibility constraint restricts short term contracts to those payment
schedules in which the manager prefers to work diligently rather than shirk. Given her deci-
sion to stay with the ￿rm one more period, and to truthfully reveal the state, the incentive
compatibility constraint induces the manager to prefer working diligently to shirking. Sub-
stituting the de￿nition of vs (x) into (1) and comparing the expected utility obtained from
setting lt1 = 1 with the expected utility obtained from setting lt2 = 1 for any given state, we









The truth telling condition requires shareholders to write contracts that induce the man-
ager to select a compensation schedule that reveals the ￿rm￿ s prospects. Information hidden
from shareholders further restricts the set of contracts that can be implemented. We as-
sume throughout that legal considerations induce the manager not to overstate the ￿rm￿ s
prospects but that incentives must be provided to persuade the manager from understating
them. Comparing the expected value from lying about the second state and working dili-
gently with the expected utility from reporting honestly in the second state and working




[v1 (x) ￿ v2 (x)]f2 (x)dx
113.3 The optimal contract
This leads to a formulation of the cost minimization problem shareholders solve. Shareholders
maximize the value of the ￿rm, inducing the manager to make choices that serve their
interests. It pays shareholders to induce the manager to distinguish between pairs of states
if and only if it is more pro￿table to create incentives that motivate her to work diligently
in at least one of the states than to shirk in both. Denote by wo
s (x) the optimal contract
that induces truth telling and diligence in the sth state. Our formulation satis￿es the Kuhn
Tucker conditions, permitting us to use Lagrangian methods to characterize the optimal




























[v1(x) ￿ v2(x)]f2 (x)dx
with respect to vs(x); that is choosing a value for vs for each x; where ￿0 through ￿3 are the
shadow values assigned to the linear constraints.
The ￿rst order conditions for this problem are
v1(x)
￿1 = ￿0 + ￿1
￿
(￿2=￿1)




￿1 = ￿0 + ￿2
￿
(￿2=￿1)
1=(bt￿1) ￿ g2 (x)
￿
+ ￿3
where h(x) ￿ ’2f2 (x)=’1f1 (x) and ’s denotes the probability the state is s: Since this
problem is globally concave it has a unique stationary point, the global maximum. Solving




If the truth telling is not binding, then ￿3 = 0 and the optimization problem reduces to
the pure moral hazard problem solved in Margiotta and Miller (2000). Otherwise ￿3 > 0;
and we substitute the ￿rst order condition into the incentive compatibility and truth telling
constraints, yielding the following system of three equations to solve for the remaining three






2 ￿ ￿3h(x) + ￿1
h
(￿2=￿1)








2 + ￿3 + ￿2
h
(￿2=￿1)









2 ￿ ￿3h(x) + ￿1 (￿2=￿1)









2 ￿ ￿3 + ￿2 (￿2=￿1)
1=(bt￿1) ￿ ￿2g2 (x)
f2 (x)dx
The ￿rms solves similar maximization problems for two of the remaining combinations of
e⁄ort level, shirking in the ￿rst state but working diligently in the second, shirking in the
second but not the ￿rst, and selects the value maximizing contract.
If there is moral hazard, it is easy to see from the ￿rst order conditions that compensation
varies with the ￿rm￿ s abnormal returns, exposing the manager to uncertainty. Consequently
the ￿rm must pay a risk premium to meet the participation constraint if her compensation
is uncertain and depends on the ￿rm￿ s abnormal returns, because the manager is risk averse.




for working at e⁄ort level j; which just o⁄sets the alternative use of her time. Setting j = 1
gives the shirking contract. A rule prohibiting any trading in the ￿rm stock is optimal in
this case, and can easily be implemented if the manager￿ s trades are publicly disclosed.
More generally, the compensation schedule should not depend on the manager￿ s private
information if, conditional on the manager￿ s e⁄ort, the distribution of abnormal returns
is independently distributed of the state. To prove this second claim, consider a model
where there is only one state, by setting ’2 = h(x) = 0: Let w￿ (x) denote the optimal
contract for the one state model where ￿￿
1 is the associated multiplier for the incentive
compatibility constraint. Now suppose ’2 6= 0 but assume f1 (x) = f2 (x) instead. For
example the states might be revealed to the manager after she has committed to her e⁄ort
level but before the end of the period when abnormal returns are realized. By assumption,
the shirking distributions are the same in both states, meaning f1 (x)g1 (x) = f2 (x)g2 (x);
so it now follows that g1 (x) = g2 (x): Hence, by inspection of the ￿rst order conditions
and the solution equations for the multipliers, w￿ (x) is also the optimal contract for the
specialization f1 (x) = f2 (x); and is supported by the multipliers ￿￿
1 = ￿1 = ￿2 with ￿3 = 0:
This demonstrates there is no reason to compensate the manager for her hidden information
unless it is intrinsically tied to the moral hazard problem of motivating her to work diligently.
4 Estimating the Costs of Moral Hazard
Our theoretical framework demonstrates the manager does not pro￿t from changes in the
value of the ￿rm if she signs an optimal contract unless there is a moral hazard problem. As
we remarked in the introduction, the disclosure rules of the SEC make it relatively easy for
boards to write contracts with managers that prohibit any trading in the ￿rm￿ s securities.
Yet our reduced form empirical evidence shows that managers bene￿t signi￿cantly from
their ￿rm￿ s good fortune. Given the risks that insider trading pose for shareholders, is moral
hazard a su¢ ciently important economic factor for ￿rms to incentivize managers?
To address this question we estimated the structural parameters of a pure moral hazard
model, and computed the costs and bene￿ts of incentivizing managers to their ￿rms. Our
13empirical analysis applies estimation techniques for estimating parametric models of optimal
contracting described in Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008a). We
extend this earlier work by estimating the model to all industries, as documented in Table
1, rather than just a select few, in order reach conclusions about the importance of moral
hazard for much broader industry spectrum of publicly traded ￿rms. A companion paper,
Gayle and Miller (2008b), analyzes identi￿cation, testing and estimation in nonparametric
optimal contracting models where there is both moral hazard and private information.
4.1 Parameterizing the model
There are ￿ve parameters to account for systematic di⁄erences in executive compensation.
They are the probability distribution of abnormal returns conditional on working, f2 (x);
the probability distribution of abnormal returns conditional on shirking, f1 (x); the risk
aversion parameter, ￿; the nonpecuniary bene￿t from shirking versus working, captured by
parameter ratio ￿2=￿1; and the nonpecuniary bene￿t of working versus retiring or accepting
employment outside the ￿rm, ￿2.


















where ￿ is the standard normal distribution function, and (￿j;￿2) denotes the mean and
variance of the parent normal distribution. As indicated in the previous section, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of restricting the mean of abnormal returns to zero conditional
on working in the data, a restriction we impose in the estimation of the parameter ￿2: This
leaves the truncation point  ; the mean of the parent normal distribution under shirking
￿1; the common variance of the parent normal ￿; the risk aversion parameter ￿; the ratio
of nonpecuniary bene￿ts from working to shirking ￿2=￿1; and the ratio of nonpecuniary
bene￿ts from working to quitting ￿2=￿0; to estimate.
The parameters of the distribution of returns are estimated separately for each sector,
whereas the taste parameters ￿2=￿1 and ￿2 are speci￿ed as mappings of executive rank. To
accommodate other factors that might a⁄ect compensation not included in the model we
assumed that total compensation, denoted e wt; is the sum of optimal contract compensation
wt plus an independently distributed disturbance term "t; assumed orthogonal to the other
variables of interest:
e wt = wt + "t
4.2 Parameter Estimates
Table 9 presents the estimates of  i for i 2 f1;2;:::;10g; the minimal abnormal return
de￿ning the lower support point of the truncated normal distribution in the ith sector. The
estimators, de￿ned as the minimum di⁄erence of the ￿rm return and the market return
across all observations in the sector, are reported without standard errors. The estimators
converge faster than the square root of sample size, so their standard errors have no impact on
14the asymptotic properties of the other parameter estimates. Loosely speaking, the reported
values represent the abnormal return that trigger de-listing from the exchange. Our estimates
suggest the points at which creditors instigate bankruptcy proceedings, are bought by private
investors, or are amalgamated, di⁄er by sector, but are dispersed around the value where
the equity value of the ￿rm is close to zero. Since the di⁄erence between the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial
returns and the return on the market is identically the abnormal return it follows that if
the return on a diversi￿ed portfolio was r; then an abnormal return of ￿r would reduce
shareholder value to zero, and we note from Table 6 that the return on the market portfolio
over this period was 1:089.
In Table 10 and the bottom of Table 11 we report estimates of the three remaining
parameters (￿1i;￿2i;￿i) that de￿ne the truncated normal distribution for each sector i 2
f1;2;:::;10g: As indicated in the previous section, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of restricting the mean of abnormal returns to zero conditional on working in the data,
a restriction we impose in the estimation equations. This explains why ￿2i is, without
exception, negative and signi￿cant.
The theory predicts that the support for abnormal returns distribution conditional on
shirking is contained in the support for abnormal returns conditional on working diligently.
Otherwise a ￿rst best contract could be achieved by paying the manager a ￿xed wage supple-
mented with a su¢ ciently high ￿ne whenever abnormal returns stray into the region outside
the latter, obviating the need for incentive pay that at best can produce a second best
contract. In our empirical speci￿cation, the two supports are the same, and they share a
common sector speci￿c parameter, ￿i, di⁄ering only in the mean of the parent distributions,
￿1i and ￿2i: Thus the mean of the truncated distribution for shirking is less than the mean
of the truncated distribution for working diligently if and only if ￿1i < ￿2i: Our estimates
con￿rm this is the case in every sector.
Abnormal returns in the health sector behave very di⁄erently than the others; although
its lower truncation point is the same order of magnitude as in the other sectors, a very
low ￿26 coupled with a very high ￿6 imply the probability density function for abnormal
returns in that sector is estimated to be very ￿ at so that it can capture some high returns
that occurred in some ￿rm/years. Similarly our estimate of ￿1i is orders of magnitude lower
than the counterparts for the other sectors, signifying an even ￿ atter density for the shirking
distribution.
The preference parameter estimates are presented in Table 11. Our estimate of ￿; the risk
aversion parameter, implies utility is concave increasing as required by the model, and lies
between results in reported in Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller(2008a). It
implies that a manager would be indi⁄erent between accepting a lottery o⁄ering even odds
of winning or losing one million dollars versus losing an amount of $103;259 for sure. Our
estimate of ￿; the parameter explaining variation not captured by the model, is similar too.2
We estimated ￿2; the parameter determining competitive opportunities in the labor mar-
ket for executives, and ￿2=￿1; a measure of nonpecuniary bene￿ts from shirking versus
working diligently, by executive position for the top six ranked executives. All our estimates
of ￿2 are greater than one numerically, but only in the upper in the upper ranks is the null
hypothesis that ￿2 = 1 rejected in favor of the one sided alternative ￿2 > 1. Recalling that
2More precisely, the variance of the measurement error is 2bt+1￿￿2￿:
15the exponential utility function is negative, these results are weak evidence that the nonpe-
cuniary bene￿ts of the job relative to outside opportunities in the labor market, decline with
promotion. It appears that ￿nancial remuneration, rather than power, prestige or perks, are
necessary to motivate executives to climb the corporate ladder. Our estimates of ￿2=￿1 show
that chief executive o¢ cers would bene￿t signi￿cantly from taking actions that are not in
the shareholder￿ s interests if they are not incentivized, whereas the opportunities a⁄orded
to lower ranked executives if their pay is not tied to performance are more limited, pre-
sumably because discretion about work activities and job duties increase with rank while
the degree of supervision declines. These issues are investigated more thoroughly in Gayle,
Golan and Miller (2008), who estimate the dynamic life cycle aspects of executive promotion
and turnover.
4.3 The Costs of Moral Hazard
We characterize the importance of moral hazard three ways, the gross loss shareholders
would incur before accounting for managerial compensation from the manager tending his
own interests, the bene￿ts accruing to the manager from tending her own interests instead of
her shareholders, and how much the shareholders are willing to pay to eliminate the problem
of moral hazard altogether.
The ￿rst measure, denoted ￿1; is the expected gross output loss to the ￿rm switching
from the distribution of abnormal returns for diligent work to the distribution for shirking,
which has probability density function f1 (x). Stated di⁄erently, ￿1 is the di⁄erence between
the expected output to the plant from the manager pursuing the ￿rm￿ s goals versus his or




this formula exploiting the identity that the expected value of abnormal returns is zero when
the manager pursues the interests of the ￿rm. Table 12 displays the estimated average over
all ￿rms in each sector for withdrawing the incentives for the managers to work diligently.
Comparing these numbers with the size of ￿rms reported in Table 3, we ￿nd that the value of
equity would decline precipitously if managers were not incentivized to align their personal
objectives with those of the ￿rms they manage. This result essentially replicates the ￿ndings
of Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008b) for a much smaller select group
of narrowly de￿ned industries (aerospace, chemicals and electronics).
The second measure, ￿2; is the nonpecuniary bene￿ts to management from ongoing shirk-
ing, that is successive managers pursuing their own goals within the ￿rm each period. Sup-
pressing the time subscript, and supposing that the bond price b is constant, let w2 denote
the manager￿ s reservation wage to work under perfect monitoring or if there were no moral
hazard problem, that is her certainty equivalent of the current compensation package, and
let w1 denote the manager￿ s reservation wage to shirk. Then ￿2, the present value of the
compensating di⁄erential for these two activities, can be expressed as the di⁄erence:
￿2 = b(w2 ￿ w1)
16Table 13 reports our estimates of ￿2 for the top two executive positions. They are tiny
compared to the expected losses a ￿rm would incur; our model predicts there are enor-
mous gains from having managers act in the interests of shareholders. (Estimates of the
lower ranked executives are considerably lower than for the second in command.) From the
manager￿ s perspective, however, the annuity implied by ￿2 is quite substantial, and for a
sizeable proportion of the sample population exceeds annual compensation. Of course if a
manager decided to shirk to receive these sizable nonpencuniary bene￿ts then her expected
compensation would fall drastically because her inside wealth would lose much of its value.
Finally we estimated the maximum amount shareholders are willing pay to eliminate the
moral hazard problem, the value of a perfect monitor. Absent moral hazard, the ￿rm would
pay the manager the ￿xed wage w2, instead of according to the compensation schedule w(x):
Another way of expressing ￿3 is the equilibrium risk premium paid to an executive for taking
a job that o⁄ers an uncertain income. The ￿rms￿willingness to pay for eliminating the moral
hazard problem for one period, denoted ￿3; is therefore:
￿3 = E [w(x)] ￿ w2
We computed this measure for the CEO and second highest highest ranked executive only,
but for each of the sectors separately, because the distribution abnormal returns conditional
on diligence and shirking vary across the sectors. Con￿rming our previous work, we deduce
from these estimates that the risk premium paid to executives is a very important part of their
pay package. Elsewhere we have argued, in Gayle and Miller (2008b), that changes in this
component are largely responsible for expected compensation and its volatility, increasing
faster than real wages over the last 60 years. Here we simply add that there is notable
variation between the costs of moral hazard across the sectors, with the health care sector
registering as an outlier worthy of special attention in a future study.
5 Conclusion
The disclosure rules of the SEC make it relatively easy for boards to write contracts with
managers that prohibit any trading in the ￿rm￿ s securities. Yet our empirical evidence shows
that managers signi￿cantly bene￿t from their ￿rm￿ s good fortune. Consistent with previous
work, in this area we ￿nd that managers exploit insider information about the pro￿tability
of their own ￿rm for direct personal gain. But this is not su¢ cient to prove that executive
compensation contracts are defective. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that in an
optimal contract the manager should not pro￿t from changes in the value of the ￿rm unless
there is a moral hazard problem. This feature might explain the paradox of inside information
and performance pay. Optimal contracting in models of generalized moral hazard with both
private information and hidden actions reward managers for truthfully revealing the state of
the ￿rm. Shareholders permit compensation schemes that correlate ￿rm performance with
executive pay because the pro￿tability of the ￿rm depends on how managers assess their
own accomplishments and ￿rm￿ s prospects, as well as what managers do, which is organizing
human resources in creative ways that add value to their ￿rm. Rewarding managers for
revealing hidden information about the ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability helps the board set contracts that
incentivize the manager￿ s work activities. If moral hazard is anywhere near as costly as our
17estimated values, then de-coupling managerial compensation from changes in shareholder
wealth would be very costly indeed.
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19Table 1
Global Industry Classification Standards











Construction , Engineering &Electrical Equip
Commercials Svc& Supplies Commercials Svc& Supplies
Transportation
Air Freight & Couriers
Airlines,Marine,Road&Rail
Transportation Infrastructure
Consumer Automobiles& components Automobiles& Components
Discretionary Consumer Durables & Apparel
Household Durables,Textiles Apparel
Leisure equipment & Products




Internet , Catalog &Specialty retail
Consumer Food& Drug Retailing Food& Drug Retailing
Staples Food Beverage Tobacco Beverages,Tobacco&Food Products
Household & Personal Products Household & personal Product
Health Care Health Care Equipment & Svcs
Health Care Equip & Svcs
Health Care Providers & Svcs
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech Biotechnology & Pharmaceuticals
Financials Banks Banks
Diversi￿ed Financials Diversi￿ed Financials
Insurance Insurance
Real Estate Real Estate
Information Software & Svcs
Internet Software&Software
IT Consulting & Services












Summary Data on Firms
(Sales, Equity, and Assets




Abnormal Returns 0:024 0:431
Return on Assets 1:42 25:96
Sales 3023:49 6753:51
Total Equity 1316:66 3198:6
Total Assets 3053:96 6685:625
Table 3

















Ratio of Salary and Bonus to Total Compensation ￿0:768 2:13
Lead Abnormal Return 2:304 1:108
Constant 80:34 50:21
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Lagged Change in Manager￿ s Stock Holdings 0:0002911 0:0000796
Ratio of Salary and bonus to Total Compensation ￿0:008193 0:523
Lagged Return on Assets ￿0:0040613 0:0004682
Lagged Dividends per Share ￿0:0347653 0:0094995
Lagged Return on Equity ￿0:000423 0:0000588





Consumer Discretionary ￿0:0591831 0:0314063
Consumer Staples 0:0172671 0:0286603
Health Care ￿0:0591459 0:0268537
Financials ￿0:0884987 0:027084











1. Market 1:089 0:097
2. Management 1:192 0:336
3. Perfect foresight 1:196 0:268
Table 7
Testing Differences in Means
Difference t-statistic p-value
Market ￿ Management ￿15:8 1:0e ￿ 17
Market ￿ Perfect ￿28:47 2:0e ￿ 18
Management ￿ Perfect ￿33:51 1:0e ￿ 17
22Table 8




Unanticipated change in abnormal return
b "n;t+1 725:95 88:97
Information of Manager
lagged change in stock holdings 11:58 1:15
lagged return on assets 16:85 6:66
lagged dividends per share 60:39 115:17
lagged return on equity 0:56 0:85






 1 Energy ￿0:8198
 2 Materials ￿0:9812
 3 Industrials ￿2:1423
 4 Consumer Discretionary ￿1:4905
 5 Consumer Staples ￿1:0323
 6 Health Care ￿1:0301
 7 Financial ￿1:0184
 8 Information Technology ￿1:1362
 9 Telecommunication Services ￿0:8911
 10 Utilities ￿0:8097
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￿1 Energy 0:898 0:032
￿2 Materials 0:333 0:005
￿3 Industrials 1:743 0:022
￿4 Consumer Discretionary 0:626 0:006
￿5 Consumer Staples 0:420 0:008
￿6 Health care 42:815 0:775
￿7 Financial 0:373 0:004
￿8 Information Technology 1:849 0:069
￿9 Telecommunication Services 0:579 0:029
￿10 Utilities 0:289 0:004
￿21 Energy ￿0:5591 0:0592
￿22 Materials ￿0:0017 0:0003
￿23 Industrials ￿0:5652 0:02452
￿24 Consumer Discretionary ￿0:0158 0:0011
￿25 Consumer Staples ￿0:0087 0:0012
￿26 Health Care ￿1608:1984 29:0809
￿27 Financial ￿0:0037 0:0004
￿28 Information Technology ￿2:2483 0:2108
￿29 Telecommunication Services ￿0:0989 0:0207
￿210 Utilities ￿0:0024 0:0003
24Table 11
Shirking Returns
Distribution and Utility Parameters.











￿2 preference for CEO 1:292 0:0162
diligence relative 2nd ranked 1:523 0:126
to retiring 3rd ranked 1:420 0:118
4th ranked 1.48 0:375
5th ranked 1:373 0:504
6th ranked 1:849 0:969
￿2=￿1 preference for CEO 1:356 0:129
diligence relative 2nd ranked 1:034 0:034
to shirking 3rd ranked 1:012 0:045
4th ranked 1:023 0:078
5th ranked 1:01 0:678
6th ranked 0:987 0:567
￿11 Mean return from Energy ￿0:7591 0:0592
￿12 shirking Materials ￿0:037 0:0033
￿13 Industrials ￿0:6652 0:0352
￿14 Consumer Discretionary ￿0:0458 0:0211
￿15 Consumer Staples ￿0:027 0:0312
￿16 Health Care ￿1901:19 40:02
￿17 Financial ￿0:0097 0:0024
￿18 Information Technology ￿4:433 0:4108
￿19 Telecommunication ￿0:2989 0:0307
￿110 Utilities ￿0:0324 0:0083
25Table 12
Gross Loss to Firms
from not Controlling Moral Hazard
in millions of 2000 $us












Benefits from Shirking in 2000 $us






Cost of Moral Hazard in 2000 $us
Sector Executive Estimate of ￿3
Energy
CEO
2nd ranked
10,450,320
1,345,098
Materials
CEO
2nd ranked
11,450,450
1,745,067
Industrials
CEO
2nd ranked
14,670,350
1,675,067
Consumer Discretionary
CEO
2nd ranked
8,210,950
3,245,067
Consumer Staples
CEO
2nd ranked
4,210,950
545,068
Health care
CEO
2nd ranked
30,410,580
10,450,000
Information Technology
CEO
2nd ranked
12,410,580
4,550,134
Telecommunication
CEO
2nd ranked
15,670,892
4,550,134
Utilities
CEO
2nd ranked
6,590,872
450,674
26